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Public health messaging about antimicrobial resistance (AMR) sometimes conveys the problem as an epidemic.
We outline why AMR is a serious endemic problem manifested in hospital and community-acquired infections.
AMR is not an epidemic condition, but may complicate epidemics, which are characterised by sudden societal
impact due to rapid rise in cases over a short timescale. Influenza, which causes direct viral effects, or secondary
bacterial complications is the most likely cause of an epidemic or pandemic where AMR may be a problem. We
discuss other possible causes of a pandemic with AMR, and present a risk assessment formula to estimate the
impact of AMR during a pandemic. Finally, we flag the potential impact of genetic engineering of pathogens on
global risk and how this could radically change the epidemiology of AMR as we know it.
Understanding the epidemiology of AMR is key to successfully addressing the problem. AMR is an endemic
condition but can play a role in epidemics or pandemics, and we present a risk analysis method for assessing the
impact of AMR in a pandemic.
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Antimicrobial resistance (AMR) is the resistance of
bacteria, viruses or other micro-organisms to anti-
microbial drugs. The most common and concerning
form of AMR is antibiotic resistance against import-
ant bacteria. Many multi-resistant bacteria have
emerged over the past century. AMR is driven by
selective evolutionary pressure, and relates to the
volume of antibiotic use through over-use or misuse
in humans, animals and food production. AMR can
also occur through random genetic mutations. Efforts
to control antibiotic use have focused on human and
animal health. AMR is an increasing concern globally,
and can increase the overall impact of any infection
by reducing or removing the ability to treat infections
successfully. In this scenario the rate of illness and* Correspondence: chau.bui@unsw.edu.au
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Is AMR an epidemic?
Epidemic and pandemic diseases must be differentiated
from endemic diseases, such as malaria and tuberculosis
(TB), which can exist in high numbers in a population
and cause high burden of disease, but with a constant
rate or slow change in rates. A true epidemic has a rise
in case rates over days or weeks, whereas an endemic
disease may rise or fall over years or decades. The words
epidemic and pandemic are often misused. A pandemic
is simply a global epidemic, and an epidemic is an outbreak
of disease that attacks many people at about the same time
and spreads through a defined population. It is defined by
rate of growth of the epidemic curve. Epidemics have a
sudden and immediate impact on the health system
and require surge capacity. For transmissible diseases,le is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
ive appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to
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reproductive number, R0. A R0 of 1 is the epidemic thresh-
old, and any R value greater than 1 presents necessary
conditions for an epidemic. The rapid increase in cases
observed during an epidemic or pandemic is what causes
immediate impacts on health systems, stressing these sys-
tems beyond normal operating capacity. A pandemic of a
highly infectious microbe will evolve rapidly and affect
many people within a short period of time. For example, an
influenza pandemic once it begins, would be expected to
reach its peak within 2 months. A working group commis-
sioned by the World Health Organization (WHO) has
listed diseases with pandemic potential, but some of these,
such as malaria, TB and AMR organisms, are usually en-
demic diseases [1]. Endemic diseases may occur in very
high numbers, but their rate is constant or changes slowly,
over months or years, sometimes decades. Sporadic dis-
eases occur at a rate too low to be endemic or epidemic.
They are typically zoonotic infections that occasionally in-
fect humans. Figure 1 shows the difference in the three
main patterns of disease – epidemic, endemic and sporadic.
AMR has been a chronic, slowly increasing phenomenon
worldwide, and causes long term impact on the health sys-
tem, as well as severe, immediate impact on affected indi-
viduals. Hospital infections such as Methicillin-resistant
Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) and multidrug resistant TB
are well known examples, but increasingly common causes
of urine infection and pneumonia are also becoming resist-
ant. AMR is not an epidemic, but an endemic condition.
AMR complicating an epidemic or pandemic
However, AMR can complicate an epidemic or pandemic.
In the case of a pandemic, where large scale infections
would affect the population in a short space of time, AMR
could contribute adversely to serious illness and death on
a mass scale. The mortality impact of AMR on a pan-
demic of any infection depends on a series of factors.
Whilst there are other contributors, the main determi-
nants are whether or not there is a drug available to treatFig. 1 Patterns of diseasethe infection. If this is zero, then the impact of AMR is
zero. It also depends on: the degree of AMR – whether it
is partial, or complete; the total mortality caused by the in-
fection; and the proportion of deaths preventable by that
drug. These factors together, determine the impact of
AMR on a pandemic. The equation can also be modified
for morbidity. Many emerging infections (such as Ebola
and MERS) have no available drug for treatment, so the
impact of AMR is zero. The overall mortality impact of
AMR can be summarised by Fig. 2. This equation is
adapted from the “risk triangle” concept [2] which is
widely used in disaster management, whereby ‘risk’ refers
to potential lives lost and is proportionally dependent on
three components: hazard, exposure and vulnerability.
Influenza is the most likely cause of a pandemic where
AMR would be a factor. Influenza morbidity and mortality
can be due to the virus itself or to secondary bacterial in-
fections, therefore AMR can doubly impact an influenza
pandemic through both antiviral and antibiotic resistance.
Based on data from the 2009 influenza A(H1N1) pan-
demic, the case fatality rate could be anything from 1 to
20% in the absence of substantial AMR [3]. Bacterial in-
fections can contribute to up to 50% of the total deaths
[4], so if bacterial AMR is a factor, then in the worst case
scenario up to 50% of deaths could not be prevented.
The burden of disease of AMR
AMR may be primary or secondary. Primary AMR occurs
when the infecting microbe is resistant at the outset and
secondary AMR is when resistance develops during treat-
ment, which may occur when people do not finish a full
course of antibiotics or when antibiotics are used inappro-
priately. AMR infections may arise in a surgical wound, at
the site of an intravenous cannula, or other skin surfaces
which have been breached due to a medical procedure.
Resistant infections can also arise in the bowel, urine or
the lungs (for example, ventilator associated pneumonia)
and are a risk in severely ill patients in intensive care.
The impact of hospital acquired AMR is serious for
the individual patient and can result in severe medicalFig. 2 Impact of AMR on a pandemic
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death. Hospital acquired infections contribute signifi-
cantly to avoidable illness and death. In the United
States (US) over 2 million people acquire an infection
from a hospital each year, with around 70% of these
hospital-acquired infections caused by AMR strains [5].
Those who are at highest risk for hospital-acquired AMR
infections are those in intensive care units (ICUs), chronic
care areas, or nursing homes and those who are immuno-
compromised. Community-acquired resistance is an in-
creasing problem with examples being urinary tract
infections and pneumonia. In its endemic state, these are
the manifestations of AMR, which contributes to chronic
burden of disease.
A 2014 review paper on AMR [6] estimated up to
50,000 deaths in Europe and the US alone are attributed
to AMR, and globally, AMR causes around 700,000
deaths annually – these figures consider AMR bacterial
infections, malaria, human immunodeficiency virus/ac-
quired immunodeficiency syndrome (HIV/AIDS) and
TB. The review also predicts that by the year 2050,
AMR will cause around 10 million deaths annually. The
reliability of these estimates (i.e. of 10 million deaths by
2050) have been questioned as an imprecise over-
estimate which draws on biased sources of data from
hospital-based surveillance systems, which do not reflect
community burden of disease [7]. Further, the scenarios
from which these estimates were generated are unrealis-
tic as they assume a rise in resistance levels for all bac-
teria, and that the rate of people becoming infected will
increase while the mortality risk per infection remains
the same [7]. Current evidence suggests these scenarios
are unlikely because mortality rates associated with bac-
terial infections are actually decreasing because of
increasing capability to provide appropriate hospital care.
Furthermore, the methods used in the 2014 review were
not been subject to peer review or scientific scrutiny and
the report does not acknowledge levels of uncertainties as-
sociated with the estimates [7]. Finally, the global burden
of disease study does not feature AMR among its leading
causes of death and disability, and shows that since 2008
infections have been overtaken by non-communicable dis-
eases globally as the leading cause of disease burden [8].
Respiratory infections, TB, malaria and HIV are the main
infectious diseases in the top 10, and there has been a re-
duction globally in communicable diseases. Whilst multi-
drug resistant TB (MDRTB) is increasing, less than 4% of
TB is MDRTB globally, and HIV drug resistance is falling
in many countries. Many of the respiratory infections
which contribute to global burden of disease occur in
countries where access to antimicrobials is uncommon.
AMR may cause acute burden of disease in a population
during a pandemic, depending on various factors. These
include the ability of the microbe to spread rapidly andcause a pandemic or large epidemic (for example, some
common types of pneumonia which may complicate influ-
enza are not transmissible between people); the severity of
the disease caused by the microbe; the degree of AMR
(partial or complete); and the number of drugs to which
resistance is present – multidrug resistant strains have a
greater impact. In addition, whether there are alternative
drugs to use in place of the ineffective drug and the extent
which disease control efforts rely on the use of
antimicrobials to mitigate a pandemic will also have an
impact.
These factors are influenced by inherent characteristics
of the pathogens themselves in addition to external con-
textual factors. For example, the ability of the microbe
to spread is determined by epidemiological parameters
including R0, incubation period and transmission rates.
The burden of AMR during a pandemic will also vary
for different regions – for example, low income regions
will likely suffer a higher burden due to poorer health
care standards in hospitals, greater crowding, limited ac-
cess to laboratories, widespread purchasing of antimicro-
bials without prescription and poor regulatory frameworks
for antibiotic use.Specific diseases with pandemic and AMR potential
Influenza
Of the diseases that have potential to cause a pandemic
where AMR may be a contributing factor to health im-
pact, influenza is the most likely. Influenza has potential
to cause large scale morbidity and mortality over a rela-
tively short period of time due to rapid spread between
people, and there are commercially available antiviral
drugs currently available for use in the event of an
influenza pandemic. Antivirals will be heavily relied
upon for control of a pandemic in the early phase, as
the development of a vaccine matched to the pandemic
influenza strain will take up to 6 months. In 2003,
adamantane-resistant H3N2 influenza strains emerged,
rendering adamantanes ineffective for treatment. The
main class of antivirals available presently are the neur-
aminidase inhibitors, including oseltamivir and zanamivir.
Dual adamantane-oseltamivir resistant strains have been
reported sporadically in seasonal H1N1 in Cambodia
(2007) and Hong Kong (2008) but are not considered to
be widespread.
In 2007 oseltamivir-resistant seasonal influenza H1N1
(A/Brisbane/59/07) strains emerged as primary resistance
in Europe. Unlike other anti-viral resistant strains of influ-
enza, this particular virus strain was able to transmit
efficiently from person to person. Within a year, the
strain had spread globally, including in regions where
oseltamivir was not used. Following the emergence of
the H1N1pdm09 virus in 2009, the oseltamivir-resistant
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out, and strains circulating across the globe since then
have been largely sensitive to NAIs. The fact that only a
small number of oseltamivir resistance H1N1pdm09
viruses have been found so far, suggests that resistant
strains may have reduced ability to transmit from person
to person, and hence may not interfere with the efficacy of
high levels of antiviral usage. The largest documented
community outbreak of oseltamivir-resistant H1N1pdm09
strains was identified in Australia in 2011, and involved
only 29 people [9]. Clinical outcomes for those in this
cluster typically resulted in influenza-like-illnesses, but
severe disease and fatalities were not reported [9].To date,
influenza strains resistant to oseltamivir and zanamivir
have been rare, with most reports occurring in individuals
with immunodeficiency.
Death and disease from pandemic influenza may be due
to the virus itself, or from secondary bacterial infections
which cause pneumonia and sepsis. Therefore bacterial
antibiotic resistance may also contribute to overall impact.
The most common bacterial infection in a pandemic is
Streptococcus pneumoniae – the percentage of bacteria
resistant to penicillin varies widely according to resistance
definitions (from <1% to up to 9.4% in one study [10]) and
region [11], and up to 25% in other studies [12]. There are
effective vaccines against Streptococcus pneumoniae,
funded for people >65 years in many countries.
Bacterial coinfections have been reported to play a role
in around a third of influenza cases managed in ICUs
and up to 30–50% of fatalities are attributed to bacterial
infections [4]. Other bacteria commonly causing in
secondary infections include Staphylococcus aureus
and Haemophilus influenzae. AMR is a significant
concern as community-acquired MRSA have been re-
ported to cause complications in seasonal influenza
seasons and during the 2009 pandemic. In a sample
of 838 critically ill minors during the 2009 influenza
pandemic in the US, 33% had evidence of bacterial
confection, of these, 39% were attributed to Staphylococcus
aureus, and among these 58% were methicillin-
resistant [13]. During the 2003–2004 influenza season
in the US, there were 18 people reported to have
severe secondary bacterial infections associated with
MSRA. Of these 18 people, the median age was
21 years, five had an underlying illness, 81% required
intensive care, 62% required positive pressure ventila-
tion and 29% died [5, 14].
Other multi-drug resistant bacteria with the potential
to impact morbidity and mortality during an influenza
pandemic especially in ventilated ICU patients include
(i) those which cause acquired AMR such as vancomycin
resistant Enterococcus (VRE), Pseudomonas, Acinetobacter
and drug resistant pneumococci, and (ii) those which
cause intrinsic AMR such as Clostridium difficile.Plague
Past pandemics have been caused by the bubonic plague,
caused by the bacterium Yersinia pestis which often
infects small rodents and is transmitted to humans
through the bite of an infected flea. However this
disease is unlikely to occur in high income settings
which have good sanitation. Historical pandemics
caused by the plague include the ‘the Justinian Plague’
of 541 AD, the ‘Black Death’ which emerged in China
in 1334, and the ‘Modern Plague’ which began in
China in the 1860s. Large scale epidemics of plague
are unlikely to occur in countries where there are no
animal reservoirs for Y. pestis. Whilst plague is an
unlikely cause of a pandemic, it can be treated with
antibiotics, therefore AMR would substantially in-
crease the fatality rate of the disease.
Smallpox
Smallpox is caused by the variola virus and was globally
eradicated in 1980 following a vaccination campaign led
by the WHO. Small pox is contagious and spreads
through respiratory droplets from infected cases as well
as contact. Smallpox is only transmissible while patients
are symptomatic. It does not usually cause very large
outbreaks and spread usually occurs to members living
in the same household. Large outbreaks in schools were
not commonly reported. Fatalities occur in up to 30% of
cases (with higher case fatality rates in high risk groups
such as children less than a year and in immunosup-
pressed individuals). The smallpox virus officially exists
in just two high-security laboratories in Russia and the
US for scientific research, hence there is still a risk of
the smallpox virus escaping the laboratory and causing a
pandemic. The genome of smallpox is also fully se-
quenced and known, so it is technically possible for
smallpox to be synthetically engineered in a laboratory.
Many governments procure and stockpile antivirals for
use in the event of a smallpox outbreak – hence the de-
velopment of AMR may be relevant in the event of a
smallpox pandemic. However, little is known about the
effectiveness of currently available antivirals such as
cidofivir and tecovirimat. It is assumed they may be ef-
fective based on lab experiments, however, because these
drugs were not tested in people with smallpox, it is not
known how effective they will be. No antiviral resistant
smallpox strains have been reported so far. Secondary
bacterial infections of the skin can also occur as a com-
plication of smallpox, and would be treated by penicillin
and cephalosporin antibiotics. These would be more
likely to be affected by AMR, but the net impact on
morbidity and mortality is unknown. The equation pro-
vided above could be applied to a smallpox outbreak at
the time, as real data becomes available, to estimate
impact.
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In their natural state, diseases such as TB, malaria and
HIV, whilst on the WHO list, are largely endemic
diseases which occur in large numbers at a constant or
slowly evolving rate in many populations. TB and HIV
also have a long asymptomatic phase and in most cases
onset of clinical disease years after initial infection. They
do not, therefore, have a large, sudden population im-
pact with clinical cases increasing rapidly over a short
period of time. This could change if these microbes are
artificially engineered for rapid spread or altered latent
periods.
Severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) was an epi-
demic infection, in contrast to Middle East Respiratory
Syndrome (MERS), which has displayed a more sporadic
pattern with occasional outbreaks. For most emerging
viruses which have spread globally (such as SARS,
MERS, Ebola, dengue, encephalitis), there are no com-
mercially available anti-virals, and thus AMR is not rele-
vant. However, drugs are in development for some of
these, such as Ebola, which has epidemic potential.
Genetic engineered pathogens
The discussion above focuses entirely on natural events.
However, there is an increasing risk of unnatural pan-
demics due to quantum advances in science, availability
of methods for engineering pathogens, open access
science and global geopolitical instability. Unnatural
pandemics may occur as a result of deliberate release or
a laboratory accident. Our systems, governance and
legislation have not kept pace with changes in science,
leaving the world vulnerable. Developments in gene edit-
ing, particularly Clustered regularly interspaced short
palindromic repeats (CRISPR) associated protein-9 nu-
clease (Cas9), makes it possible today to engineer plants,
animals, human beings and microbes. Editing of healthy
human embryos, for example, is underway in Sweden,
and modification of avian influenza viruses, SARS and
other pathogens has already occurred. Synthetic viruses
and genetic engineering of pathogens is an example of
dual-use research of concern (DURC) - research intended
for benefit but which may also harm humans. The
capacity for biological weapons of mass destruction is
vastly greater today than even a decade ago, and an unnat-
ural pandemic may not be correctly detected as unnatural
because of our inability to differentiate unnatural from
natural epidemics [15]. This caveat is provided to make
the point that with new gene editing technology, highly le-
thal or resistant microbes can be created in a laboratory
and released in populations. This may override our
current knowledge of how microorganisms behave in na-
ture, as their natural characteristics such as resistance pro-
file, latent period, incubation period and transmissibility
can be altered significantly.Conclusions
In summary, in its present form, AMR is a gradually
increasing problem with a chronic and endemic pattern.
The global concern about AMR can be broken down
into two separate concerns. The first is the gradually ris-
ing incidence of AMR in many bacteria including TB
and many hospital or community acquired infections.
This is an endemic problem, driven by patterns of anti-
biotic use in animals and humans, with a gradual rise in
cases over time. The impact on a population level can be
compared to other endemic diseases such as diabetes or
heart disease. The second concern is AMR as a com-
pounding factor in a pandemic infection. Whilst the
term pandemic is widely misused, technically it refers to
a global epidemic in which there is a rapid rise in cases
over time, and therefore an immediate, sharp impact on
society and its systems. If AMR affected a pandemic, it
would contribute to overall death and disability on a
sudden and large scale. Of all currently known infections
with pandemic potential, influenza is the most probable
cause of a major human pandemic. There are other
potential causes, but many of these have no available
drugs for treatment. In addition, the technology exists
today to change living organisms from their natural state
into an unnatural state, which may result in previously
unknown types of pandemics. The exact impact of AMR
in a pandemic needs to be quantified for specific dis-
eases, and we have provided a general formula which
can be used to do so. This formula can be expanded
with many more factors, but the most important deter-
minants of impact are included.
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